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Abstract
One of the characteristics of Polish foreign aid is its focus on the ‘transition experience’
and civil society. This specific celebration of the ‘Polish success story’ contrasts sharply
with public debates that frequently criticise the weaknesses of Polish civil society and
the difficulties in state – non-state relations. The Polish Aid apparatus itself is not
immune to these problems, often exhibiting antagonistic relations between NGOs
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By looking at the relations linking these stakeholders
this text aims to analyse relations between the ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ in Poland. As the
text demonstrates, complicated contemporary relations between NGOs and the State
are first the outcome of the country’s troubled history of civil society, and an inherit-
ance of the Solidarity movement when the concept of civil society was built on the idea
of opposition to the state. Second, the anti-state attitude characterising contemporary
organisations was also fostered by foreign institutions, which supported the Solidarity
movement in its efforts to overturn the socialist regime in Poland, and later in the
1990s, became the strongest proponents of civil society and NGOs. Finally, these pre-
existing historical conditions for the strong polarisation of NGOs and state institutions
are now additionally reinforced by the ‘professionalization’ and ‘institutionalisation’ of
NGOs. However, the uncritical promotion of ‘Western standards’ exhibited in the
ideals of transparency and audit culture, rather than generating positive change only
antagonises NGOs and state institutions. The ultimate effect of this process is that
NGOs become more and more obsessed with bureaucratic modes of operating, and
start to resemble state institutions. Effectively, NGOs risk losing their identity which is
so strongly built on the non-governmental aspect of their work. Effectively, the perpetu-
ation of the state/non-State opposition becomes a strategy which allows this separate
identity to be maintained and NGOs status to remain unchallenged.
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Introduction
Shortly before the Christmas of 2008, I attended a discussion meeting organized by
one of the development NGOs in Warsaw. The purpose was to debate the strategies
to educate Polish society about the development needs of ‘Global South’. The event
took place at one of the Warsaw bars. It started with the chair introduced himself
and his organization. There were no more than 15 people present, most of them in
their twenties, so our host suggested that everybody said a few words about him or
herself. The introductions were progressing slowly with people eagerly talking
about their NGOs and projects they were involved in. But sitting in the corner,
I could observe the discomfort on the face of one of the participants – Karolina –
whose turn to talk about herself was approaching.
I met her in the Department of Development Cooperation in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, where she was involved in Global Education – programmes tar-
geting Polish society and aiming to expand people’s knowledge about global devel-
opment issues and foreign aid. Before joining the MFA she was working abroad
with various NGOs. The topic of the meeting was therefore matching her interests
perfectly. She had found an invitation to this event at the internet portal dedicated
for nongovernmental organizations. She also forwarded it to other colleagues from
the MFA, suggesting it as an interesting way to spend an evening and learn few
things. Over lunch in the Ministerial cafeteria, together with yet another colleague
who decided to go – Aleksandra – we discussed the best way to get to the meeting,
so as to make it on time. Worried that we might be stuck in the office till late,
Karolina and Aleksandra laughed that they could always excuse themselves,
explaining that they must go and do a monitoring of that project as it was spon-
sored by the Polish Aid Programme – a scheme managed by their department. ‘This
is our project so we need to be there!’ they said joking, about the oversight pro-
cedures of their own institution.
Now sitting at the meeting they seemed less energetic and a bit shy. I started to
wonder why this was so. They knew some of the people in the room from previous
similar occasions. They were collaborating with others in a professional capacity –
often acting as the ministerial supervisors of the projects that the MFA was fund-
ing, and NGOs were implementing. Karolina also knew particular discussants from
the time when she was actively involved in the organisation supporting Fair Trade.
With some participants she did a graduate course in development studies at
Warsaw University. Still, apart from modest nods to acknowledge each other’s
presence there was not much interaction between Karolina and her friend on the
one side, and other participants of the meeting on the other. Even though they
knew some people, they did not sit with them and virtually did not speak to anyone
before the meeting had officially started. Finally when it was Karolina’s turn to
342 Critique of Anthropology 36(4)
introduce herself, she briefly explained her interest in the subject and only men-
tioned her current position in the MFA in passing. She clearly was not comfortable
with making her job association a public matter in that room.
As she explained to me later, she did not want to be perceived as ‘The Woman
from the Ministry’. She came because she was interested in the topic. Even though
she shared her interests with many other people in the meeting – they were all of the
same age, with similar working and educational experiences – it was clear that there
was some mismatch between her and the other participants. While the rest of the
attendees were representing NGOs, she and her friend were the only people from
the MFA, from a State institution. When later on we were discussing this uncom-
fortable division, she told me that she felt not only labelled, but as if she should not
be proud of her job and her institutional affiliation. In fact, while introducing
herself at the meeting, she made a disclaimer saying she was there as a private
person, not as the Ministry representative. Nevertheless, she was upset by the way
the meeting moderator commented on the fact that the project of which this meet-
ing was part of was financed by the Ministry. Like in the case of all similar projects,
organizers were obliged to inform participants about the sponsor. In this meeting
the NGO leader briefly mentioned with some grinning: ‘by the way we just have to
let you know that the project is sponsored by the Ministry’. His announcement was
accepted with smirks from the audience, expressing ironic woe for the Ministerial
rules. For Karolina, this small incident was rather disturbing: ‘Why do they pat-
ronize us that way, what’s with those smirks? Are they ashamed of being financed
by the Ministry? They do not make those faces when they have to thank the EU for
the sponsorship, or some Norwegian Funds. It is not easy to get Ministerial grant,
they should be proud that they succeeded! It is very positive and they just make it
unpleasant’. In fact for both her and Aleksandra the tension was the most disturb-
ing at the personal level. As they explained, they put a lot of effort in to their work
trying to build good partnerships with NGOs. They believed that they were doing
all they could to make cooperation easier and to meet NGOs expectations. Having
friends among NGOs, who now refrained from extended communication at public
meetings, made the animosity even more disturbing. It was clear that the division
was there, and that it was based on the line of NGOs versus the Ministry. This
paper will be dedicated to the examination of this specific relationship between the
NGOs and the MFA as one of the crucial elements shaping the aid chain originat-
ing from Poland.
One of the characteristics of Polish Aid managed by the MFA is its focus on
‘transition experience’ and the support for democracy and civil society – a trajec-
tory which is unorthodox within the EU circles, but is typical for the representa-
tives of Eastern Europe (Draz_kiewicz, 2013; Kucharczyk and Lovitt, 2008;
Lightfoot, 2010; Petrova, 2011; Szent-Ivanyi, 2012, 2014). The state orchestrated
Official Development Assistance, but also a big proportion of the initiatives
undertaken by NGOs independently of the State, are done with a conviction
that Poland exhibits a successful story in democratisation efforts, and that the
experiences of the Polish people in that field could be transferred to other societies
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(Draz_kiewicz, 2008). But this glorification of ‘Polish transition experience’ con-
trasts sharply with public debates which frequently criticise the weakness of
Polish civil society and the difficulties in the state – non-state relations (Graff,
2010; Nowicka, 2010).
In this paper, I want to analyse historical and contemporary roots of this
somehow ‘schizophrenic’ condition of the Polish development scene: which on
one hand celebrates the ‘Polish transition experience’, while in fact, on daily basis,
the NGOs and governmental stakeholders of Polish aid struggle to make their
own complicated relations work. I will focus specifically on the relationship
between developmental organisations and the Department of Development
Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is characterised by
strong animosity and distinction between NGOs and the state. While such sep-
aration of the state/non-state division is part of the more general conceptualisa-
tion of the international development apparatus (Alvarez, 1999; Ferguson, 2006;
Jad, 2007), here I will argue that, in the Polish case, it is additionally an expres-
sion of the specific Polish historical and contemporary socio-political context, on
the other hand.
As I will demonstrate, the contemporary complicated relation between NGOs
and the State is the outcome of the country’s own troubled history of civil society,
and both internal and external influences shaping the discourse on civil society in
general and the Polish development scene in particular. First, the Polish version of
the civil society concept was originally formulated during the socialist era by the
intellectuals of the Solidarity movement, who build it on the ideas of opposition
towards the state. This notion remains unchallenged and seems to still hold a very
strong position. I want to examine how the fact that the democratic movement of
the 1970s and 1980s had little appreciation of the state as a form of public authority
(Mastnak, 2005) resonates with the contemporary state – non-state relations, and
the current lack of trust toward state institutions. As I will demonstrate, the rooting
of the civil society concept in the ideal of independence resulted in the contempor-
ary defensive attitudes of the NGO representatives being (who usurped the civil
society discourse, associating it solely with ‘third sector’) suspicious towards any
governmental action relating to them. Second, I want to examine the role of exter-
nal actors in fostering these antagonistic relations. What are the consequences of
the foreign institutions’ actions, which supported the Solidarity movement in its
efforts to shed socialist regime in Poland, and, later in the 1990s, became the
strongest propagators of the civil society promoting it as the best tool for democ-
ratisation and state transformation? Finally, I want to ask, how these pre-existing
historical conditions for the strong polarisation of NGOs and state institution are
now additionally reinforced by the ‘professionalisation’ and ‘institutionalisation’ of
NGOs – a practice which belongs to the more complex struggle of Polish society
with modernity, and establishing its status as a modern, developed, Western coun-
try? In the development scene, this dynamic is exhibited at best by the application
of terms such as ‘emerging’ versus ‘established/mature’ donor – with Poland
being defined by the first category signalling its immature, non-modern character.
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Eager to move up to the second category and receive international recognition,
Polish organisations are still looking up to their Western counterparts for a tem-
plates worth mimicking. However, as I will demonstrate, the uncritical promotion
of ‘Western standards’ exhibited in the ideals of transparency and audit culture,
instead of generating positive change only reinforce mistrust and antagonises
NGOs with their main partner, i.e. State Institution. The additional effect of this
‘professionalisation’ process is that NGOs become more and more obsessive with
the bureaucratic modes of operating, and start to resemble to some extend state
institutions. Consequently, NGOs risk losing their identity which is so strongly
built on the non-governmental aspect of their work. Effectively the perpetuation
of the state/non-State opposition becomes a strategy which allows this separate
identity to be maintained and not-like-state status unchallenged.
This article draws on the research I have been conducting on Polish foreign aid
since 2007. My work consisted of traditional research methods which included
extended participant observation in various NGOs, tens of interviews, as well as
some small surveys. My research was occasionally facilitated by the more in-depth
professional involvement with particular NGOs or the Department of
Development Collaboration in the MFA. For more than a year I worked for
Solidarity Fund – an institution which since its (re)establishment in 2012 has
become a key player among Polish promoters of civil society abroad. Even
though the work in this organisation did not constitute a part of the systematic
fieldwork, the observations I made while working there became very important for
this article.
‘They promised us civil society but they left us with
thousands of NGOs’
In September 2011, Polish Parliament established its first Act on development aid
(Kancelaria Sejmu, 2011). The general provisions section explains that develop-
ment aid should primary consist of ‘promoting and supporting the development of
democracy and civil society, including development of parliamentarianism, prin-
ciples of good governance and respect for human rights’ (Kancelaria Sejmu, 2011).
The economic development and poverty elevation become only secondary issue in
the Act’s definition of development cooperation. This emphasis on democracy
promotion and civil society building as the main objectives of Polish Aid is built
on the premise that Poland has a successful story to tell when it comes to the
country’s ‘transition experience’ from socialism to whatever came next.
This idealistic image contrasts sharply with the internal assessments of the cur-
rent state of affairs in the country, in particular those which focus of the Polish civil
society (Buchowski, 1996; Glin´ski, 2006b; Graff, 2010; Nowicka, 2010). As Graff
(2010) notices one of the main ‘problems’ with Polish civil society is the privileged
position of NGOs, and persistent undermining (both by activists as well as aca-
demics) of other forms of engagement. In the mainstream discourse, the passage
from civil society talk to discussion of NGOs’ issues is so smooth, it is almost
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invisible (Gawin and Glin´ski, 2006; Glin´ski, 2006a; Kurczewski, 1992; Lewenstein
and Melchior, 1992; Rymsza et al., 2007; Zaborowski, 2005). Effectively, the con-
version of civil society and NGOs into the one entity is being taken for granted.
They promised us civil society but they left us with thousands of NGOs concluded one
of my somewhat frustrated NGO informants during one of our several informal
conversations about Polish Third Sector. In fact, this quotation is borrowed from
Janos Kis, a Hungarian social activist who was talking about his own homeland
(Graff, 2010). But indeed, it equally well describes contemporary Poland. Here the
concept of civil society flows between being understood as an analytical, yet
highly politicised tool, and a naturalised idea in the specific expert culture of
NGO activists.
As a result, the equating of NGOs with civil society becomes internalised into
the popular language, successfully turning it into a native category. It is a category
which gives an illusion of greatness, of representing The People, and giving an
ability to encompass masses with all their differences and variety. In fact, it
describes a narrow group of elite classes operating in the highly institutionalised
NGO mode. In this paper, that is exactly the usage to which I am referring. Even
though the usefulness of the ‘civil society’ concept in social analysis have been
criticised widely (Benthall, 2000; Clough, 1999; Comaroff, 1999; Dunn and
Hann, 1996; Ferguson, 2006; Gupta, 1995; Lewis, 2002; Navaro-Yashin, 1998). I
find it hard to avoid this term in my research, neglect its omnipresence and power.
For that reason, in this article, I am concerned with ‘the native category’ of civil
society. Following the way the term is used in the public discourse in Poland, the
way it was used by my informants, and Polish scholars supporting them (even if I
do not agree with their stand), here I will refer to civil society understood as an
assemblage of NGOs, and, at the same time, NGOs considered as surrogates of
civil society (Alvarez, 1999). Given the importance of the local version of the civil
society discourse in the activities of Polish NGOs (particularly developmental
organisations), and furthermore taking into account a specific overlap of the
‘civil society’ and ‘NGO’ terms, in this paper I want to examine how they
became one phenomenon, and both terms became synonymous. As I will demon-
strate in the following sections, it is exactly the process of equating ‘civil society’
with NGOs that laid the ground for the ongoing antagonisation of NGO repre-
sentatives with the State.
Civil Society – the round trip of the concept
In Poland, NGOs as we know them today are quite a recent phenomenon. Also, the
concept of civil society, has not been part of the public discourse in Poland until
mid 1980s. It was not until the ‘Second Solidarity’ and the end of martial law in
Poland that the civil society, as a political concept, became linked with the activities
of Polish opposition (Zaleski, 2012). Before that, the concept did not belong either
to the state or to Solidarity discourse. Conceptualising their visions of future, or
naming their own activities, supporters of Solidarity would refer to terms such as
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‘Self-governed Republic’, ‘parallel society’, ‘self-organising society’, ‘alternative
society’, ‘parallel structures’ – terms emphasising the external nature of the society
vis-a-vis the state, and its opposition to official apparatus. During Martial Law,
these features would be even more strongly emphasised, when term ‘underground
society’ became a way for conceptualising the activities of opposition (Ost, 1990;
Staniszkis, 1984; Zaleski, 2012).
The shift from the self-governed and underground society talk to civil society talk
could happen only later, with the softening of state regime in the mid 1980s and
amnesty of 1986. Only then the term started to be used by a very narrow group of
dissidents who supported by Western elites had an opportunity to travel abroad,
and educate themselves there (Lewenstein and Pawlik, 1994; Wedel, 1998). Inspired
by the political and sociological literature which was unavailable in Poland, con-
versations and meetings with French, German or American intellectuals, people
such as Adam Michnik, Marcin Kro´l, Bronislaw Geremek, Ireneusz Krzemin´ski,
Bronislaw Misztal, were among the first using the term civil society in relation to
Polish opposition (Zaleski, 2012). The concept’s discovery in Eastern Europe
resulted from the fall of the revisionist approach to socialism. In the light of the
disappointment with the contemporary political ideologies, civil society promised a
political vision that seemed feasible. The aim of the opposition activists was to
reconstruct social bonds to impact social reality from bottom up. With fresh mem-
ories of Martial Law, the government tightly associated with the state constituted
their main enemy, an opponent for those who opted for freedom, democracy and
‘authentic life’. The idea was to create society independently of the State and the
Party. Consequently the civil society of the eighties was defined as antagonistic to
the state (Renwick, 2006).
Such understanding of the civil society, even though it has damaging and frus-
trating repercussions for Today’s NGO activists antagonising them with the state,
in the 1980s, it was seen as the only possible solution for the opposition leaders. It
was also fostered and supported by their Western benefactors (such as National
Endowment of Democracy in the US) which in the 1980s was first and foremost
interested in bringing down the socialist government in Poland, and, therefore, was
ready to support any ideology which would mobilise that process (Wedel, 1998).
Eventually, in the 1980s, through the combination of internal and external dynam-
ics, the distinction between the state and society (the civil-society as it later became
to be known) got stabilised as a constitutive of democracy, or even as democracy’s
conditio sine qua non (Mastnak, 2005). This separatist vision would become one of
the central factors in identifications of what civil society later became and what
ideologies it still resonates with today (Gellner, 1994).
Interestingly, as it was demonstrated by Zaleski (2012), this Solidarity led tra-
jectory of the Polish variation of the civil society history, coincides in time with the
state interest in bringing the concept to the public discourse. Since the late 1980s,
the term civil society started to be applied in official state media in reference to the
freedom of associations and organisations, which was introduced soon after. The
fact that both state and opposition started to use the term civil society at more or
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less the same time allowed for it to become internalised in Polish public sphere –
even if for both sides it had a slightly different meaning. Within Solidarity cohorts,
this term has been used as a way to describe opposition to the state. For a socialist
state, it was a way to describe a public realm, which they were ready to free, but
which was still to be controllable through various registration procedures. Indeed,
opposition leaders welcomed the new legal arrangements with excitement. When in
the early 1990s, NGOs started to mushroom across the country, it was clear that
most of them were set up by the previous opposition members, giving them a legal
framework for their social action. From the underground opposition, they moved
their activities to legal organisations, yet the feeling of state oppression, and anti-
state attitude became a trait which up until today remained the main feature in the
autoidentification process. The constant antagonising with the state became a way
of legitimizing one’s action and authentication strategy.
But it was also around the same time when the civil society concept arrived in
the country through its third trajectory, this time in the ‘democratisation’, ‘trans-
formation’ and ‘development’ programmes sponsored by the Western institutions
(Lewenstein and Pawlik, 1994; Wedel, 1998; Zaborowski, 2005). The civil society
term, which was not that popular until late 1980s in the West, now thanks to
Solidarity hype became resurrected and grasped the attention of the Western intel-
lectuals (Keane, 1988, 1998, 2003; Ost, 1994). Through the promotion of the civil
society ideology in volumes such as ‘Civil Society and the State’ (Keane, 1988),
what started as political visioning – an intellectual manifesto of those unsatisfied
with the realities of the Eastern Bloc – soon became an analytical framework for
the Western academics. Eventually the concept became naturalized as an ‘ideal
model’. The political project which gave it a new life started to fade to the
background.
Now, in the early 1990s, it was exactly this version of the term, which arrived in
Poland via International aid agencies. Civil society became one of the synonyms
and conditions of modernity. It was a Western-like modernity which since 1989
became an obsessive goal for Polish society. Civil society, as a concept which
operates through its very elusiveness, being a rather vague idea, difficult to
grasp, became one of the many political tools to deem the society as not modern,
and hence in need of change and external intervention (Comaroff, 1999). This
narrative paved a way for foreign development agencies to enter the country and
assist its efforts in civil society building – a somehow ironic situation for a country
which has only proved to have very effective social organisation, ready to build
social movements capable of overthrowing the unwanted state regime and motivat-
ing socio-political change. Yet, as Wedel (1998) notices, this process was not simply
a one sided attempt of the West to impose its ideas over the Rest of the world. At
that time, with the opening of the borders, Polish political activists, intellectuals
and various community leaders became particularly keen to search for inspiration
outside the country. Foreign organisations were eagerly sponsoring ‘study tours’ to
the Western Europe and North America for the ex-opposition, now NGO leaders,
to educate them about various aspects of social activism and organisation.
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Foreign donors were also actively involved in establishing NGOs in Poland (among
them were organisations which today are key actors in foreign aid: Polish
Humanitarian Action – originally set up as Polish office of French EquiLibre;
Education for Democracy Foundation – founded with the support of American
teachers, Batory Foundation – founded by Soros, or PAUCI – Polish – American –
Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative) and promoting them as the best incarnation of
civil society ideas, the best vehicle for the bottom-up social activism. According to
Sampson the role of external intervention in the creation of civil society cannot be
overlooked (cf. Wedel 1998a). As he noted, during that time, the emphasis was put
on the measurable and immediate outcomes of the projects that were concerned
with civil society building. As the result ‘the goal in Poland, for example, was to
increase the number of NGOs from 3000 in 1988 – far above any Eastern European
country – to 20,000 by 1992’ (1996). Such an attitude paved the way to conflating
NGOs with civil society.
This NGO rush was confirmed to me by a social activist, a leader of the various
NGOs and a 1989 Round Table1 negotiations participant, with whom I talked in
2009. As he explained to me, in the post 1989 era, associations and various organ-
izations were perceived by him and others alike as a ‘natural’ solution. Among the
activists, there was a shared feeling that they would facilitate the change. What he
failed to address, though was the fact that before the need for NGOs became
‘natural’ it was carefully fostered by various factors. Among them were structural
adjustment reforms, and the ‘shock therapy’ prescribed by Sachs and Balcerowicz
(Sachs, 1994, 2006). Along with ‘freeing the market’ the advocates of implementing
neo-liberalism in Poland were calling for freeing the state from the responsibility to
protect the welfare of its citizens. What used to be state domain, now became a
responsibility of ‘civil society’, which basically meant that NGOs became asso-
ciated with the provision of social services, an outsourced state, rather than vehicles
for political activism (Kamat, 2004; Mandel, 2012). This trajectory was enforced by
study tours to the Western countries, where Polish social leaders, hosted by local
NGOs, were educated about the necessity to create institutionalised social organ-
isations, and the importance of NGOs for truly modern society. Eager to quickly
shed the humiliating stigma of a non-modern, socialist state, to mimic Western
solutions, these activists adopted the vision of the society, where social activism is
mobilised by ‘People’s institutions’ – NGOs. What proved problematic, however,
was a detailed definition and the agreement on the language of the description
and the issue of representation: how to find the language that would define
new identities:
For sure, at the beginning it was crucial to define our own identity. Then later this world
of the organizations controlled by [western donors] appeared . . . you know the ones from
which we wanted to break through. [But] we didn’t have our own language yet. (. . .) Of
course the Non-Governmental cut through, and became the most successfully, surely
more than non-profit. But it was because it was aiming the best at the essence of
what all those shivering identities were. Historically it fitted well: that we are those
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Non – governmental. (. . .) At the end it was simply a matter of language. It was hard for
us to use the term ‘social organizations’ and so on. (. . .) We couldn’t use it because it was
seized [by the communism/the state] . . .So we needed some fast lexical borrowing.
As this NGO leader explained me, at the beginning, the distinction was simple: it
was ‘our side’ versus the governmental side. The discourse, the language, the insti-
tutional scaffolding came only later, only after ‘1989’, together with Western pre-
scriptions for the transformation, and with the belated readings of the Western
social theories. And so, building on those bases, the conviction that the future lies
in the institutionalized associations – NGOs, as they became known, prevailed.
Eventually, in the mid-1990s, the conflation of the NGOs and the civil society
concept was in full swing.
Emerging as a donor – professionalisation
All these features which took shape during the Polish People’s Republic era, and
later when since 1989, the country was subjected to ‘development’ schemes, are
becoming crucial now, when the Polish state and society are establishing their own
foreign aid apparatus, and insist on ‘exporting Polish transition and civil society
building experiences’. Clearly, such a strong interest in promoting civil society
abroad is a result of the past; personal experiences of people who while being
involved in opposition movement of the 1980s, and later, in the 1990s, being
busy with building their own organisations benefitted from the support of
Western donors. Experiencing first-hand the hardships of the transition process,
and the importance of foreign support, they have genuine interest in assisting
others who today are undergoing similar processes.
However, the very same process of building Polish Aid structures also reveals
other, long lasting consequences of the complicated history of the civil society in
Poland. Among them is the self-identification of NGOs as non/anti-political.
Again, this might be considered a typical trait for development per-se (Ferguson,
1994), but as we could see, in the Polish case, the de-politicisation of NGOs was
facilitated by particular historical context: firstly by the events of the 1980s when
politics and the very term ‘political’ became associated solely with the state appar-
atus, and as such considered ‘contaminated’; second, by the structural adjustment
era and subsequent substituting of political activism with technical, service oriented
NGOs. This is very much a case for most Polish organisations involved in inter-
national development, who do not formulate their action in political terms: the
NGO operating in Africa focus predominantly on technical issues and service
provision (education, health, water and sanitation) or micro-economics, without
addressing political issues shaping them. But even those organisations which oper-
ate at the East of Poland, and define their activities in terms of ‘democracy
support’ – a trajectory which one would think is explicitly political, tend to limit
their projects to activities of mostly technical nature (for instance, trainings for
journalists, workshops for local organisations on management related issues,
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trainings for leaders, etc.). As I learned through my work in Solidarity Fund, a
GONGO which distributes state funds for ‘democracy support’ initiatives, most
organisations applying for the funding were primarily interested in these technical
issues, and were promoting NGOs as the primary vehicles for change, yet
emphasising their role as the basic service providers rather than social or political
activists. With few exceptions, the political motivations, the ‘democracy’ talk
seemed to work as artificially added superstructure, securing the match with the
CFP objectives, and guaranteeing success in the funding competition.
Paradoxically, this led to the literal transplantation of Polish transition experience
with other nations: by eliminating political engagement from their actions, promot-
ing the idea that transformation is a technical process to be led by institutionalised
NGOs, whose otherwise primary purpose is service provision, Polish NGOs effect-
ively replicate among their Eastern Neighbours the same mechanisms which in
1990s, the advocates of neo-liberalism were subscribing for Poland.
But there are also other immediate traits of the complicated, Polish history of
the civil society, in the country’s ODA apparatus. They are in particular visible in
the difficult partnership linking NGOs with its main donor MFA. Built on the
strong antagonistic feelings towards the state – a trait which was prominent
among Solidarity cohorts and which was fuelled by Western supporters of the
country’s democratisation – civil society as we know it today (i.e. the aggregate
of NGOs) became defined by the constant friction with the State. This is particu-
larly on display in the world of Polish developmental NGOs which are financially
dependent on MFA – they share a similar interest in building a strong, centralised
state-run Official Development Assistance apparatus, and, as I will demonstrate in
the following sections, have significantly similar – bureaucratic, institutionalised –
modes of operating, but still have difficulties in effective collaboration with the
state administration.
Yet, while historical implications have set the tone of the present relations
between NGOs and state institutions, there are also other, contemporary factors
contributing to that process. Among them is the never ending, and never-to-be-
satisfied obsession with Modernity. The struggle to be recognised as modern, in
spite of the country’s accession to the EU orDAC/OECDwhich at least superficially
ought to work as guarantors of this status, is constantly ongoing (Draz_kiewicz,
2013). In the development sector, it is visible in the way the country strives to shed
the patronising label of ‘emerging donor’ (Hattori, 2003; Mawdsley, 2012). For
NGOs, one way to receive international recognition as the ‘established’ donor, an
expert in the development field, is through progressive ‘professionalisation’.
However, this professionalisation, which entails institutionalisation and a larger
emphasis on knowledge production techniques, actually approximates State and
non-State modes of operating. Consequently, NGOs risk losing their own identity,
which is so strongly built on differentiation from the state. Paradoxically then, the
professionalization, while intended as the process of ordering the work of activists
and making it more successful, becomes counter effective: NGOs which are defined,
not by their actual mode of operating, by what they are, but by what they are not,
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identified through pointing to an anti-group – the state becomes obsessed with the
state (and whoever embodies it) (cf. Latour, 2005). In the light of the ongoing
institutionalisation, the animosity with the State becomes a way to remain the
pretence of difference between NGOs and state institutions. The sense of conflict,
constant underlining of the differences between NGOs and state administration,
while it helps organisations to maintain separate identities, works against any
fruitful collaboration on both sides.
The way this mechanism is played out is very well exhibited in the efforts of
Polish NGOs to professionalise themselves and Polish Aid. Enthusiastic about
development pursuit, searching for ways foreign aid should be organised, Polish
NGOs look up to the West as a potential, and the best source of information, often
the template to be copied. Special workshops are designed, the aim of which is to
professionalise Polish foreign aid activities. These workshops are usually conducted
(by special request of the Polish side) by foreign experts, whose taken-for-granted-
authority of ‘established donors’, provide unquestioned credibility of their teach-
ing. Such initiatives have various topics, yet often, even though they were targeting
NGOs, their centre of attention was Official Development Assistance – that is aid
managed by the states. Over, and over again various courses were ramming home
official DAC/OECD definitions of what ‘real’ development was, what ‘counts as
aid’, and using Millennium Development Goals, or other inter-state agreements
(such as Paris Declaration or European Consensus on Development), as markers of
how development problems should be solved, how international aid should be
distributed and managed. Paradoxically, as a result of these initiatives, their non-
governmental participants, soon became the strongest supporters and advocates
for the otherwise mainstream, state-centered and state-orchestrated development
politics. It did not result, however, in the growing support of the state institutions
and their actions, but quite the opposite.
Passionate about development issues, eager to be recognised as ‘professional’
players, Polish development activists, inspired by their Western counterparts,
started to associate professionalism in development practice with the rules set up
by foreign institutions such as DAC/OECD and treating international treaties as
ideal templates for the best practice. Since the Polish state does not treat these
requirements rigorously and does not follow the lead of Western players (as can be
seen in the geographical allocations of Polish Aid prioritising Eastern Europe over
Africa), it became perceived, by NGOs, as the main obstacle in global develop-
ment. Instead of becoming a partner, with whom NGOs could jointly combat
poverty issues, MFA started to be painted as the main enemy, and the reason
for the development problems. Polish NGOs, which were already prone (due to
the historical implications described above) to the rhetoric which polarises the state
and non-state institutions, now easily subscribed to the visions promoted by the
western organisations which were suggesting aggressive watchdog campaigns as the
best model for encouraging change in the state politics and institutions.
Effectively, today much of the NGDO energy is directed towards campaigns
which are aimed at Polish state institutions (predominantly MFA, and occasionally
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the Parliament) with a hope of controlling and correcting its actions. Most of the
activities are focused on knowledge production. Their main outputs are dozens of
documents, brochures, policy papers, leaflets and reports which are calling ‘the
Polish state’ to change its ODA politics and mechanisms. Convinced by the
Western educators that such tools for knowledge are an attributes of profession-
alism and ‘mature donors’, and ‘if effectively applied, have the potential to trans-
form the efficiency and effectiveness of development and humanitarian agencies’,2
Polish NGOs became obsessed with methods which usually are associated with
bureaucratic institutions – otherwise known for being preoccupied with producing
papers (although not necessarily reading them).
The paramount manifestation of this process is ‘Annual Aid Watch Report’
published by Zagranica Group and presenting NGOs taking on Polish ODA
(Grupa, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010). This annual Report is not only one of the main
publications produced by the Polish Development NGOs but its premiere is a
paramount moment in the NGOs calendar.
The work on the report started as an initiative of a small group of development
workers representing different NGOs who were involved in the lobbying campaigns
within the Polish governmental institutions. They gained their experience in this type
of work through collaboration with Western NGOs, particularly through the
Concord Group (the platform of European NGDOs by the EU). The inspiration
to write the report was triggered precisely by this cooperation. Every year Concord
produces a joint report on national ODAs of EU member states. It was the work on
the Polish contribution to this report that, with time, developed into the preparation
of a separate, extensive document on Polish ODA. The work on the report was
mobilised and strongly influenced by western modes of producing such documents,
and the ambition to fulfil yet another ‘‘European Standard’’ in order to be recog-
nised as the Established (rather than Emerging) Donor. The contextualisation of this
practice in this specific discourse, facilitated the perception of the Report (and other
documents alike) as the best tool for change and social action. The people who
orchestrated its origins in Poland were truly convinced, that simple extrapolation
of working methods originating from the West, will guarantee also their success.
The report’s aim is to expose the faults and weaknesses of the Polish ODA. Even
though at first glance the document is addressed towards the general public, it is
clear that its ultimate addressee is the Ministry itself. Instructed by the Western
counterparts, at various courses on what a ‘real’ or ‘good’ development should be
authors of the annual report had a readily available check list to pin down the
state’s flaws. They perceive Report as the best tool for making a change – hoping
that Report will unveil all the faults of the state institution, shame it and force it to
make corrections. Through the evocation of the State in the text (Poland needs
to . . .Poland must, the Government is obliged . . .) it is clear that the document forms
a tool of communicating with the Ministry. The Report is a voice of disappoint-
ment and rancour. Even though the authors present it as an ‘independent’, rational
and methodological study, it is an expression of the clearly critical attitudes
towards Ministerial operations.
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Yet even though the report is advertised as an ‘independent’ analysis of the
Polish (State) ODA, in fact it represents the voice of the actors, whose financial
sustainability is strongly dependant on the state funds, and who would not be
capable of conducting their development initiatives without MFA grants. For
that reason, some NGO leaders, when the first editions of the Report were to be
published, were worried about the possible consequences of their participation in
this initiative with respect to their relationships with the Ministry. Interestingly this
was particularly the case of one of the largest developmental NGOs, who each year
benefited from the particularly strong financial support of MFA in the form of
grant allocation. On one hand, the management of the organisation was interested
in the production of the report, hoping that it would motivate some changes within
the ODA system. On the other hand, since organisational management did not
want to disturb its particularly good relationship with the MFA it did not want to
be associated with the strong criticism that the NGO report represented. As a
result, a staff member was delegated to work on the report, yet was asked to
keep her involvement ‘under the radar’. This proved especially difficult when she
had to obtain some information from the Ministry which was essential for the
document. One of the typical methods in gaining any information from public
institution is through invoking the Access to Public Information Act, which regu-
lates the rights of the citizens to obtain information. Being familiar with this tool,
she decided to send a fax to the Ministry in which she explained her work on the
report and put forward a request for access to information. A few hours later, when
she was already out of the office, her superior gave her an unexpected call and in
nervous tones reprimanded her for such an ‘irresponsible move’. The fax was
withdrawn. For the management, the request made by the employer was too con-
frontational and risking possible damage of the relations between this NGO and
the Ministry.
The confrontational character of the Report, and potential risks resulting from
it, was not overcome by changing writing strategies (for instance moderating text’s
tone) but by manipulating the authorship attributes. While each of the co-authors
was leaving a strong mark on the section he or she produced, the document at the
end was signed as the collective voice of NGOs, of the Zagranica Group. This
allowed authors and NGOs they were representing not only to shed away individ-
ual ownership (and responsibility) for the political claims included in the Report,
but also facilitated a false impression of document’s objectivity. The affiliation with
the Zagranica Group facilitates the recognition of the report as the ‘voice of NGOs’
(of civil society), rather than the statement of isolated individuals or organisations.
The recognition of the expert status of the authors and their professionalism
(objectivity) is further enabled by the application of official name, identifying
authors as ‘the Monitoring Group’ and the recognition of the initiative as ‘a
Project’ with its own objectives, schedule, coordinator, budget, etc. Even if the
monitoring group consisted mostly of the people who were representing organisa-
tions involved in African trajectory of Polish aid, and were expressing their agendas
in the Report, the presentation of the Report as the voice of Zagranica Group
354 Critique of Anthropology 36(4)
offered illusion that the postulates of few organisations, are in fact representative to
the otherwise diverse group of developmental stakeholders.
In spite of these shortcomings, the Report was not dismissed neither by the
NGOs who were representing different views than those presented in the Report,
nor by the MFA, whose employees often informally questioned the objectivity of
the publication. Yet it was due to the presentation of Aid Watch campaign and the
Report itself as yet another ‘European standard’ that most NGOs subscribed to
the initiative easily, or at least did not want to object it. For the same reasons, the
Ministry could not dismiss the publication, as its ability to conduct a dialogue with
‘civil society’ was considered a necessary condition of proving the mature character
of Polish Aid. The openness to ‘Aid Watch’ campaign was considered of a par-
ticular value in that regard, even if in fact this ‘public audit’ practice invented in the
West, once extrapolated to Polish environment hold more confrontational than
dialogue value.
The good illustration of the antagonising dynamic, that the report had, might be
its premiere. It is a carefully designed event which, each year (up to the 2011) was
taking place at the Development Aid Forum organised by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. The aim of this daylong, open to public event was to publicise the activities
of the Polish state in foreign aid and to encourage Polish society to get involved in
development issues. It also worked as the venue where NGOs were invited to
present themselves, and their work abroad and engage with visitors. The official
part of this initiative included the presentation of the official, ministerial report on
Polish Aid. In the same event, shortly after the MFA session, NGOs were given the
time to present their Report.
In 2010, the Forum took place in the Library of Warsaw University, which often
works as a venue for such public events. Opening the Forum was a ministerial
presentation. Behind the high table sat representatives of the Ministry. The audi-
ence composed mostly of NGO staff, some journalists and few diplomats repre-
senting foreign embassies. The ministerial representative introducing the MFA
report in an excessively enthusiastic way focused on the positive sides of the
national aid programme, presenting it as a success. The presentation included a
slide show full of graphs and charts.
There would be nothing extraordinary in this meeting; however, there was one
incident which made it stand out from other bureaucratic rituals of that kind. Just
when the presentation was about to begin, a group of young people wanted to enter
the room. There should have been nothing controversial about that, as the meeting
was open to everyone, yet some of those people had their heads covered with
gigantic eyeballs. For the ministerial staff, who were greeting guests by the door,
this performance, came as a surprise: ‘It is not in the official programme’ one of the
staff members observed. Not understanding the purpose of it, he thought that the
people with those giant balls on their heads looked like aliens. It did not make sense
to him, and looked like a joke threatening the serious character of the meeting.
The performers were, therefore, asked to take their headgear off and only then were
allowed to come in. Once inside the conference hall, they formed a line which also
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formed a message from the letters printed on their T-shirts: ‘We are keeping an eye
on Polish aid’. However, even though their performance was prelude to the NGO-
Aid-Watch report (which was next on the meeting agenda), some of the members of
the audience had difficulties with understanding what was the meaning of the
mysterious ‘eyeballs’ and the T-shirt coordinated slogan. One of the older minis-
terial staff members later on asked me: ‘Ela, you hang out with those NGO people,
so maybe you will explain to us, what is it all about, what are these bulbs?’ Clearly,
the ‘Aid Watch’ phrase, so literally translated from English, and promoted by the
activists who were inspired by the Western workshops on monitoring national
ODAs, made no sense to some of the Polish public.
The ‘eyeball performance’, as one of its initiators told me, was a way to bring
attention towards the otherwise serious campaign. To get public interest was cru-
cial, as just after the presentation of the ministerial report, NGOs got their chance
to present their publication. Now they took their places at the same table, and
moved to the Powerpoint presentation which, just like the previous one, was full of
graphs and charts. This time, however, speakers would use this opportunity to ask
provocative questions and eloquently pin down ministerial weaknesses. The whole
performance was carefully crafted. The aim was to use this once a year opportunity
when the Ministry representatives were impossible to had to listen to the voice of
NGOs in the presence of journalists, to voice all concerns and criticism towards the
ministerial approach to development. In fact for NGOs, it would be almost impos-
sible to gather such a crowd in one room, so the aim was to generate the strongest
effect possible, hence the ‘eyeball performance’, but also focus on the most con-
troversial aspects of Polish aid, such as Polish involvement in Afghanistan, or lack
of long-term funding, weak involvement in Africa.
The aim was to confront the Ministry. This was additionally to be achieved by
creating suspense over the NGO report, which, even though it was ready before the
conference, it was not to be distributed to anyone before the Forum. As it was
explained to me by one of the authors, there were suggestions to change tactics, and
send electronic copies to the MFA, at least as a sign of courtesy – after all the
presentation was taking place at the event organised by the Ministry, where NGOs
were the guests. Occasionally, there were also propositions to hold more informal
discussions between the Ministerial and NGO representatives about the findings of
the Report. However, such ideas were usually quickly rejected, as ‘unprofessional’,
suggesting corruption, and ‘getting too close with the MFA’ and supposedly
weakening the Report effect. The idea was, that the public presentation of the
controversial politics of the Ministry, would have a greater impact, and more
chances to induce some reaction from the MFA.
Yet in spite of all these efforts, to get the attention of the ministerial staff, there
was not much of a conclusion to those meetings, which were functioning more as a
performance of power (especially on the NGO side), and a sign of courteous
cooperation (on the ministerial side); they finished as they started with polite
greetings and wishes for better future cooperation. The Report was presented as
the expression of NGOs’ transparency desires, claiming that greater access to
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information (and Report supposed to fulfil this function), could result in better, i.e.
more rational management of social problems. But by the MFA, it was perceived
as unnecessarily confrontational. For the staff members of the Department for
Development Collaboration, who were targeted audience of the publication, and
whose work was its main topic, the Report’s content was not very revealing – most
of the issues tackled were very well known to them, and, in many instances, they
actually agreed with the NGO authors. Year by year, reprimanded by the NGOs
that their work was not done properly, ministerial administrators were losing inter-
est in the Report itself. The ultimate example of the counter effectiveness of the
NGO publication, or rather the way it was antagonising the NGDOs with the
MFA, was the Ministerial decision to stop organising Development Forums.
Originally, the event was created as an opportunity for MFA and NGOs to jointly
show off their accomplishments and to propagate development issues. Yet at some
point, it became a venue for development organisations to vent their frustration
with the way Polish Aid was managed and publicly expose the flaws of MFA.
The Report, an emanation of the widely promoted audit practice which ought to
act as a sign of professionalisation of the Polish development scene, was promised
as the effective tool for political action, in fact became yet another opportunity to
reinforce NGO – state animosity. As Strathern (2000b) points out, the reference to
accountability implies that people want to make their trust visible through the
demonstration of information. However, at the same time, the very desire to do
so, already points to the absence of trust. The document was produced as the
expression of the transparency ideals. Yet as Tsoukas (2005) noticed, this very
ideal in fact undermines the trust that is necessary for an expert system (and we
can treat the development system as such) to function effectively. This was espe-
cially the case in the relations between NGOs and MFA as exemplified in the above
‘Battle of Reports’. Both Reports (Ministerial and NGOs) sides were claiming
expert status. Via Reports they supposed to offer not just their viewpoint but the
‘real’ version of what a Polish ODA is. Yet the NGO – Aid Watch attempted to
undermine the expert character of the Ministerial work. Even though both reports
were based on the same sources (ministerial statistics provided by the same admin-
istrative staff) the NGO report, both through text and the verbal communication of
its authors, challenged the credibility of the Ministerial publication. Most import-
antly, however, the Report, and other documents alike published in the audit spirit
were an obvious instrument of surveillance expressing the trust issues that NGOs
had with the Ministry (cf. Strathern, 2000a, 2000b).
Yet, no matter how many Aid Watch campaigns were undertaken, how much
information the MFA would release through its website, booklets, pamphlets, con-
ference presses etc, the feeling that there was some information hidden, seemed to
never go away. However, this general dissatisfaction with the access to information
was not equal to the actual lack of knowledge of what was going on the other side.
Representatives of both NGOs had various personal relations with the represen-
tatives of the ‘other side’ (as in the case of Karolina described in the beginning of
this paper shows). And even though, through those informal channels they could
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learn about various plans, moves, etc. of their counterparts, until they obtained
‘official’ information they acted as if they ‘didn’t know’.
This characteristic was additionally aggravated by the specific qualification of
the knowledge which could be considered as information. In the process of writing
Report, the strongest emphasis was on obtaining information of a ‘statistical’
nature. The emphasis on this type of knowledge – abstract, precise – ought to
work as a signal of the professional, serious and objective and independent char-
acter of the publication. It ought to guarantee trust towards the information and its
providers (Strathern, 2000b). But in the eyes of some of the MFA readers, it was
exactly these features which were making the Report less trustworthy. It was
perceived as dehumanised, missing the human face of the bureaucrat (sic!)
behind the procedures and numbers. While they agreed that many observations
of the Report were valid, its authors were accused of failing to acknowledge the
context in which ODA was shaped, and understanding how complicated institu-
tional dynamics of the MFA were.
Effectively, what started as the attempt to professionalise Polish aid, to fashion
Polish NGOs as the ‘Established’ rather than ‘emerging’ players at the inter-
national arena, following ‘international’ agreements and standards, effectively led
to the widening polarisation of NGOs with the State. The promotion of ‘official’
mainstream discourses of development placed the State at the centre of attention
and deemed it as solely responsible for the (failure) of international development.
Given the history behind Polish NGOs and their antagonistic attitude towards the
state, we can see how development organisations were already prone to this sort of
rhetoric, which yet again confirmed their vision of the world where state, and
bureaucrats’ actions are suspicious and require control and corrections. Such
visions also wash NGOs clean of any responsibility they might have for the
work of development apparatus. This is particularly visible in the way the NGO
Report is constructed: while, as I noted earlier, the great proportion of Polish ODA
is outsourced to Polish NGOs, there is no mentioning, or evaluation of their
activities in the Report, as if they were not part of Polish ODA mechanism, and
not benefiting from it financially. This allows NGOs to not see themselves as part
of the problem, but separate from it, blaming all failures of Polish Aid on the state.
Finally, the obsession with transparency, audit and other knowledge production
techniques approximates NGOs to the state in the operating mode. Just like bur-
eaucrats, they become fixated with producing documents, seeing them as the
important tool for governing social reality. Moreover, even though NGOs
assume different goals and agendas from the ministerial workers, in fact both
camps, are often driven by their similar interest in the improvement of Polish
ODA and the global fight against poverty – this was certainly the case for
Aleksandra or Karolina whom I described at the beginning of this paper. It
seems then that development activists from Poland might have more in common
with their Ministerial counterparts, than they would wish to admit. The recognition
of those similarities became, however, an unbearable thought for many of the
development aid leaders – whose organisational identity is so strongly engraved
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in the non-governmental particle of their label. With progressing institutionalisation
NGOs risk losing their identity as social entities which represent a bottom-up
approach and which do not operate through bureaucratic channels. The fact that
they so heavily depend on state money to operate, and with NGO staff members
and state administrators easily manoeuvring employment opportunities between
the two camps, this also works against their primary identification as a non-gov-
ernmental bodies. Yet, the perpetuation of the non-State – State conflict allows this
separate identity to be maintained.
Final comments
Since their development in the post-1989 era, the organising characteristic of
NGOs was differentiation from the state. However, today ‘third sector’ gets
much closer to their state partners than they themselves would probably wish. In
spite of the shared goals, similarities and commonalities joining various individuals
at all sides, the division marked along the institutional affiliation has prevailed and
seems to be here to stay. The civil society concept, which in not-yet fully shaped
form left Poland in the 1980s via the ‘inspirational travels’ of the Solidarity dissi-
dents to the West, and later made it back to the country to become simultaneously
internalised by the opposition and state regime, and later aggressively promoted by
the foreign aid agencies received a special place in Polish public discourse. The
circumstances which shaped it – such as Solidarity movement, Round Table nego-
tiations, and socialist state propaganda – empowered it and decided of its strong
popularity today. But at the same time, became its worst enemy, setting the context
of the phenomenon as the constant battle between the state and the rest, and
defining NGOs not via their actual mode of operating or field of action, but
through emphasis on their non-governmental element, which in current circum-
stances remains nothing but an illusion anyway. That is why, as I was trying to
show in this paper, contrary to the popular believes, in the production of this state/
non-state division, a much more active role is played by NGOs, as it allows them to
remain the false impression of separate identity. Effectively, in Poland, we can
observe how the specific dynamics of the NGO–state relations, where original
enthusiasm and perception of the NGOs as an essential instrument for creating a
new state have been gradually taken over by mutual mistrust, competition and
even antagonism.
The generic separation of NGOS and State representatives forms one of the
most common identification creating separate fronts. The idea of civil society,
promoted at the time of dramatic social change and propagated as the solution
to contemporary structural and political problems by both State apparatus and
Opposition, and later by foreign evangelists of development and change, quickly
found popular support and became taken for granted, naturalised. The conse-
quences of the stubborn and uncritical promotion of this specific phenomenon
we can observe today in complicated relations between organisations and state
institutions. It is somehow paradoxical that institutions that face such major
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difficulties in building positive relations with each other, who actually experience
first-hand the negative consequences of the implementation of the antagonistic civil
society discourse, today insist on promoting it abroad. Moreover, they claim that,
as representatives of a country which itself went through the processes of civil
society building, they are predestined to export this model to other societies
making it a trademark of the Polish Official Development Assistance.
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Notes
1. The Polish Round Table Negotiations took place in Warsaw and gave a space for discus-
sions between opposition leaders (mostly representing Solidarity – a Trade Union) and
state leaders. They were held in the presence of the press and Catholic Church observers,
and paved the way for the future political and economical transformation of the country.
2. http://www.odi.org.uk/rapid/tools/toolkits/KM/Index.html, http://www.development-
network.eu/events/rt_i_-_warsaw, cf. materials provided at the site of the project
‘Fostering Global Responsibility: Building a Development Policy Knowledge Network
to Enhance NGO Public Outreach Initiatives in EU New Member States’: http://www.
development-network.eu/.207.
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